Equilibrium flow in a physical network with a large number of users (e.g., transportation, communication, and computer networks) need not be unique if the costs of the network elements are not the same for all users. Such differences among users may arise if they are not equally affected by congestion or have different intrinsic preferences. Whether or not, for all assignments of strictly increasing cost functions, each user's equilibrium cost is the same in all Nash equilibria can be determined from the network topology. Specifically, this paper shows that in a two-terminal network, the equilibrium costs are always unique if and only if the network is one of several simple networks or consists of several such networks connected in series. The complementary class of all two-terminal networks with multiple equilibrium costs for some assignment of (user-specific) strictly increasing cost functions is similarly characterized by an embedded network of a particular simple type. 1. Introduction. Different kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, and computer networks exhibit congestion effects, whereby increased demand for certain network elements (e.g., roads, telecommunication lines, and servers) tends to downgrade their performance or increase the cost of using them. In such networks, the users' decisions (e.g., choice of routes) are interdependent in that their optimal choices (e.g., the fastest routes) depend on what the others do. If they all choose optimally, given the others' choices, then the users' choices constitute a Nash equilibrium. Even if the users are identical in all respects, due to the congestion externalities, their choices at equilibrium may differ. However, if the number of users is very large and each of them has a negligibly small effect on the others, then they have equal equilibrium payoffs or costs. Moreover, the payoffs or costs in different equilibria are the same (Aashtiani and Magnanti [1]). With a heterogeneous population of users (i.e., a multiclass network; Dafermos [5] ), this need not be so. As the following example shows, if the users are not identical, and are differently affected by congestion, equilibrium costs may vary not only across users, but also from one Nash equilibrium to another. Example 1.1. A continuum of three classes of users travels on the two-terminal network shown in Figure 2 (a) below. Each user has to choose one of the four routes connecting the users' common point of origin o and the common destination d. The cost of each route is the sum of the costs of its edges. For each user class, the cost of each edge e is given by an increasing affine function of the fraction x of the total population with a route that includes e. The fraction of the population in each class and the corresponding cost functions are given in Figure 1 , where blank cells indicate prohibitively high costs. Clearly, users in each class effectively have a choice of only two routes from o to d e 1 and e 2 e 5 for Class I users, e 2 e 5 and e 3 for Class II, and e 3 and e 4 e 5 for Class III. (The costs of the other two routes are prohibitively high.) If all the users choose the first-mentioned route for their class, their choices constitute a strict Nash equilibrium in that each user's cost is strictly less than it would be on the alternative route. The same is true if everyone chooses the second-mentioned route. However, the costs in the first equilibrium ( 3 41, 0.77, and 2.46 for Class I, II, and III users, respectively) are different from those in the second equilibrium
1. Introduction. Different kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, and computer networks exhibit congestion effects, whereby increased demand for certain network elements (e.g., roads, telecommunication lines, and servers) tends to downgrade their performance or increase the cost of using them. In such networks, the users' decisions (e.g., choice of routes) are interdependent in that their optimal choices (e.g., the fastest routes) depend on what the others do. If they all choose optimally, given the others' choices, then the users' choices constitute a Nash equilibrium. Even if the users are identical in all respects, due to the congestion externalities, their choices at equilibrium may differ. However, if the number of users is very large and each of them has a negligibly small effect on the others, then they have equal equilibrium payoffs or costs. Moreover, the payoffs or costs in different equilibria are the same (Aashtiani and Magnanti [1] ). With a heterogeneous population of users (i.e., a multiclass network; Dafermos [5] ), this need not be so. As the following example shows, if the users are not identical, and are differently affected by congestion, equilibrium costs may vary not only across users, but also from one Nash equilibrium to another. Example 1.1. A continuum of three classes of users travels on the two-terminal network shown in Figure 2 (a) below. Each user has to choose one of the four routes connecting the users' common point of origin o and the common destination d. The cost of each route is the sum of the costs of its edges. For each user class, the cost of each edge e is given by an increasing affine function of the fraction x of the total population with a route that includes e. The fraction of the population in each class and the corresponding cost functions are given in Figure 1 , where blank cells indicate prohibitively high costs. Clearly, users in each class effectively have a choice of only two routes from o to d e 1 and e 2 e 5 for Class I users, e 2 e 5 and e 3 for Class II, and e 3 and e 4 e 5 for Class III. (The costs of the other two routes are prohibitively high.) If all the users choose the first-mentioned route for their class, their choices constitute a strict Nash equilibrium in that each user's cost is strictly less than it would be on the alternative route. The same is true if everyone chooses the second-mentioned route. However, the costs in the first equilibrium ( 3 41, 0.77, and 2.46 for Class I, II, and III users, respectively) are different from those in the second equilibrium ( 3 08, 0.88, and 3.02, respectively), and similarly for the mean cost ( 2 10 in the first equilibrium and 2.22 in the second). In Example 1.1, neither of the two Nash equilibria Pareto dominates the other: For Class I users, the first equilibrium cost is higher, and for Class II and III, the second. In fact, for the network in Figure 2 (a), this would be so for any assignment of cost functions. This is because the routes in this network, as well as in the essentially identical one 2(b), are linearly independent in the sense that each of them has an edge that is not in any other route. As shown by the author in Milchtaich [13, Theorem 3] , this topological property implies that, for any assignment of cost functions, all the Nash equilibria are Pareto efficient. In the other two networks in Figure 2 , the routes are not linearly independent. In these networks, some Nash equilibria may be strictly Pareto dominated by others. user can effectively choose only between e 5 and a single alternative route, which is e 2 e 3 for Class I users, e 2 e 4 for Class II, and e 1 e 3 for Class III. There is one Nash equilibrium in which Class I users take e 5 , and Class II and III take the respective alternative routes. In this equilibrium (which can be shown to be Pareto efficient), each user's cost is the same, 18/7. There is another Nash equilibrium in which Class I users take their alternative route e 2 e 3 , and Class II and III take e 5 . Again, the equilibrium cost is the same for all users, but this time it is higher, and equals 24/7. Both equilibria are not strict: Any user taking e 5 would incur the same cost on his alternative route, and vice versa. Because the cost functions are affine, this implies that any convex combination of the two equilibria (in terms of the percentage of users in each class taking each route) is also a Nash equilibrium, with costs given by the corresponding convex combination of the above costs. Thus, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria, which can be Pareto ranked because, in each equilibrium, the costs for all users are the same. The main result of this paper is that, if the costs to users are allowed to differ, whether or not there exist some cost functions with multiple equilibrium costs for some users depends on the network topology. The author (Milchtaich [12] ) showed that in a network with parallel routes (like the one in Figure 4 (a)), the equilibrium costs are unique for any assignment of cost functions. In this paper, it is shown that, in fact, the same is true for all five networks
e 2 e 1 (d) (e) Figure 4 . Two-terminal networks in which the equilibrium costs are always unique. The network in (a), in which one or more edges are connected in parallel (gray curves indicate optional edges), is embedded in each of the other four. Any network homeomorphic to one of these five networks is said to be nearly parallel.
in Figure 4 , as well as for all the networks obtained by connecting two or more of them in series. Moreover, these are essentially the only two-terminal networks in which uniqueness of each user's equilibrium cost is guaranteed. For any other two-terminal network, it is possible to find an example with multiple equilibrium costs, very similar to Examples 1.1 or 1.2 above. Indeed, any such network has one of those in Figure 2 embedded in it, in a sense made precise below. These four networks, which will be referred to as the forbidden networks, are the minimal networks for which multiple equilibrium costs are possible. Thus, this paper gives two equivalent topological characterizations of two-terminal networks that may or may not have a multiplicity of equilibrium costs. The first directly identifies all networks with unique equilibrium costs for any assignment of strictly increasing cost functions, and the second all the networks in which, for some assignment of such cost functions, the equilibrium costs are not unique. Moreover, the results below show that, in the first kind of networks, not only are the equilibrium costs unique, but also the percentage of each class of users traversing each edge at equilibrium is generically unique. This entails that, unless certain special relations exist among the cost functions, this percentage is the same in all Nash equilibria.
In this paper, networks are always assumed to be undirected, in contrast to the more common practice in the literature of assuming that edges are directed, and can be traversed in one direction only. Here, such traveling restrictions, if they exist, are considered part of the cost functions, which may (but do not have to) assign a very high cost to one of the two directions. The merits of this approach are demonstrated by the results in this paper (and in Milchtaich [13] ). These results show that the uniqueness of the equilibria is, indeed, linked to the topology of the underlying undirected network (and the same is true for their Pareto efficiency).
2. Graph-theoretic preliminaries. An undirected multigraph consists of a finite set of vertices together with a finite set of edges. Each edge e joins two distinct vertices, u and v, which are referred to as the end vertices of e. Thus, loops are not allowed, but more than one edge can join two vertices. An edge e and a vertex v are said to be incident with each other if v is an end vertex of e. The degree of a vertex is the number of edges incident with it. A path of length n is an alternating sequence p of vertices and edges v 0 e 1 v 1 · · · v n−1 e n v n , beginning and ending with vertices, in which each edge is incident with the two vertices immediately preceding and following it and all the vertices (and necessarily all the edges) are distinct. Because of the latter assumption, each vertex and each edge in p either precedes or follows each of the other vertices and edges. The first and last vertices, v 0 and v n , are called the initial and terminal vertices in p, respectively. If they are clear from the context, the path may be written more simply as e 1 e 2 · · · e n . An arc is a path of length one, consisting of a single edge and its two end vertices. It may be viewed as an assignment of a particular direction to the edge. Obviously, each edge can be directed in two ways that differ from each other in the identity of the end vertex chosen as the initial vertex and that chosen as the terminal vertex. One, and only one, of these two arcs is contained in (i.e., is a section of) any path that includes the edge. In this sense, any such path specifies a particular direction for the edge. The set of all arcs in a network is denoted by .
A two-terminal network (network, for short) is an undirected multigraph together with a distinguished ordered pair of distinct vertices, o and d (for "origin" and "destination"), such that each vertex and each edge belong to at least one path with the initial vertex o and terminal vertex d. Any path r with these initial and terminal vertices will be called a route. The set of all routes in a network is denoted by .
Two networks G and G will be identified if they are isomorphic in the sense that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the vertices of G and G and between their edges, such that (i) the incidence relation is preserved, and (ii) the origin and destination in G are paired with the origin and destination in G , respectively. A network G is a subnetwork of a network G if the former can be obtained from the latter by deleting a subset of its edges and nonterminal vertices (i.e., vertices other than o and d). A network G will be said to be embedded in the wide sense in a network G if the latter can be obtained from the former by applying the following operations any number of times in any order (see Figure 5 ):
1. The subdivision of an edge: its replacement by two edges with a single common end vertex.
2. The addition of a new edge joining two existing vertices.
3. The subdivision of a terminal vertex, o or d: addition of a new edge e joining the terminal vertex with a new vertex v, followed by replacement of the former by the latter as the end vertex in two or more edges originally incident with the terminal vertex.
Two networks that can be obtained from the same network by successive subdivision of edges are said to be homeomorphic. Such networks can be obtained from each other by the insertion and removal of nonterminal degree-two vertices. For present purposes, they are nearly identical. By combining addition and subdivision of edges, complete new paths, which only have their initial and terminal vertices in a given network G, can be added to it. This is done by first joining the two vertices by a new edge e, and then subdividing e one or more times. Because any vertex and any edge in a network are in some route, this shows that if G is a subnetwork of another network, it is also embedded in it in the wide sense. A special case of terminal subdivision is terminal extension. In this operation, the new vertex v replaces the terminal vertex (o or d) as the end vertex of all the edges originally incident with the latter. The qualifier "in the wide sense" used in this paper is meant to distinguish the present notion of embedding from the more restrictive one in Milchtaich [13] , which does not allow general terminal subdivisions but only terminal extensions. Terminal subdivisions may be viewed as selective terminal extensions: the new edge is appended to two or more, but not necessarily all, of the routes.
Two networks G and G with the same origin-destination pair, but no other common vertices or edges, may be connected in parallel. The set of vertices in the resulting network G is the union of the sets of vertices in G and G , and similarly for the set of edges. The origin and destination in G are the same as in G and G . Two networks G and G with a single common vertex (and, hence, without common edges), which is the destination in G and the origin in G , may be connected in series. The set of vertices in the resulting network G is the union of the sets of vertices in G and G , and similarly for the set of edges. The origin in G coincides with the origin in G and the destination is the destination in G . The connection of an arbitrary number of networks in series or in parallel is defined recursively. Each of the connected networks is embedded in the wide sense in the network resulting from their connection.
A parallel network is one consisting of one or more edges connected in parallel, as in Figure 4(a) . A network G will be said to be nearly parallel if it is homeomorphic to one of the five networks in Figure 4 . It is not difficult to see that this is the case if and only if G has a single route, two parallel routes, or can be constructed from a network with two parallel routes by adding to it one or more parallel paths, with common initial and terminal vertices. The following graph-theoretic result plays an important role in this paper. The proof of this and the other results in the paper are given in §7. (ii) One (or more) of the forbidden networks is embedded in the wide sense in G.
3. The model. The population of users is modelled as an infinite set I (e.g., the unit interval 0 1 ), endowed with a nonatomic probability measure (e.g., Lebesgue measure), the population measure. This measure assigns values between zero and one to a -algebra of subsets of I, the measurable sets, which are interpreted as the set sizes relative to the total population. For a given network, a strategy profile is a mapping I → (from users to routes) such that, for each route r in the network, the set of all users i with i = r is measurable. For each arc a, the measure of the set of all users i such that a is contained in i is called the flow on a in , and is denoted by f a . Note that each edge e is associated with a pair of arc flows: one giving the flow on e in one direction and the other in the opposite direction. However, if all the routes in the network pass though e in the same direction, then one of these flows is always zero, and in this case, there is no ambiguity in associating e with a single arc flow, which may be denoted by f e .
The cost of each arc a for each user i is given by a nonnegative and strictly increasing cost function c i a 0 1 → 0 . When the flow on arc a is f a , the cost for user i of traversing a is c i a f a . Note that, for each user, each edge e is associated with a pair of cost functions, one for each direction. In each direction, the cost only depends on the flow on e in that direction, and not on the flow in the opposite direction. Although this assumption may involve some loss of generality, there are two important cases in which it does not. In the first case, all the routes in the network pass through e in the same direction, and, therefore, the flow in the opposite direction is always zero. Hence, only one cost function has to be associated with e for each user i, which, without ambiguity, may be denoted by c i e . In the other case, there is one direction of e which is prohibitively costly for all users. This would be true for all edges if passing through each edge were only allowed in one direction-an assumption made in much of the literature (e.g., Newell [15] , Sheffi [18] , Bell and Iida [4] , and Nagurney [14] ; but not Beckmann et al. [3] ). For the sake of generality and simplicity of notation, in this paper the cost functions are not required to have the property that traversing an edge in a particular direction is very costly for all users. However, this requirement would not affect any of the results below, as long as there are no restrictions on which of the two directions has this property. The case of predetermined directionality is discussed in §6. Another assumption implicit in the definition of cost function is that the cost of each arc a for each user only depends on the total flow on a, and not on the identities of the other users. This does not imply that the congestion impacts of any two users are assumed to be equal, but rather that they are in fixed proportion to one another. Thus, for example, if one user (a bus, say) has twice the impact of another user (a sedan) in one arc, then the impact is also twofold in any other arc. The "size" of each group of users, given by the population measure, expresses its potential contribution to congestion, and, in heterogeneous populations, does not necessarily reflect the number of members.
The cost of each route r for each user i is defined as the sum of the costs for user i of the arcs contained in r. The cost thus depends on the flow on each of r's edges in the direction specified by the route. A strategy profile is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium (in the nonatomic game defined by the network G and the cost functions) if each route is only used by those for whom it is a minimal-cost route. Formally, the equilibrium condition is: For each user i, 
where, for each arc a, f a is the flow on a in . For an equilibrium , the minimum in (1) is user i's equilibrium cost. In the special case of a transportation network with identical users, the above definition essentially reduces to the principle, formulated by Wardrop [19] and others (see Nagurney [14, p. 151]) , that, at equilibrium, the travel time on all used routes is equal, and less than or equal to that of a single vehicle on any unused route.
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Under weak assumptions on the cost functions, at least one Nash equilibrium exists. Specifically, a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium is that, for all arcs a, c i a x is a continuous function of x for each user i and a measurable function of i for each 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The proof of this assertion, which is similar to that of Theorem 3.1 in Milchtaich [12] , is omitted. The assertion can also be deduced from more general results, e.g., Schmeidler [17, Theorem 1] or Rath [16, Theorems 1 and 2]. The main concern of this paper is uniqueness. If all the users are identical, then the equilibrium itself is typically not unique. This is because, at equilibrium, any two groups of users of equal size taking different routes may interchange their choice of routes without affecting the equilibrium. However, the equilibrium flow on each arc in the network is the same in all Nash equilibria, which implies that the equilibrium cost is also unique (Aashtiani and Magnanti [1] ). In fact, as the following proposition shows, this result extends to the case in which the users' cost functions are only identical up to additive constants in the sense that, for each pair of users i and i and each arc a, the difference c i a x − c i a x is a constant that does not depend on x. For further extension of the uniqueness result, see Altman and Kameda [2] .
Proposition 4.1. If the users' cost functions are identical up to additive constants, then, for every two Nash equilibria, the flow on each arc in the network in the first equilibrium is equal to that in the second, and the same is also true for each user's equilibrium cost.
For identical users (and, more generally, cost functions that are identical up to additive constants), uniqueness of the equilibrium costs would be guaranteed even if the cost functions were only assumed to be nondecreasing, rather than strictly increasing. However, for a heterogeneous population of users, the assumption of strict monotonicity (which in this paper is part of the definition of cost function) is critical. For example, suppose that one user class is totally unaffected by congestion, while another class is affected by it. If there are several minimal-cost routes for the first class of users, they may choose among them arbitrarily. Their choices do not affect their own equilibrium costs, but may affect those of the second user class. Therefore, regardless of the network topology, the equilibrium costs need not be unique.
The main question this paper addresses is whether, for a given network, the equilibrium arc flows and the equilibrium costs are unique for arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily identical up to additive constants) cost functions. A network will be said to have the (topological) uniqueness property if, for any assignment of (strictly increasing) cost functions, the flow on each arc is the same in all Nash equilibria. As the following proposition shows, this property can also be defined in terms of the equilibrium costs.
Proposition 4.2. For every two-terminal network G, the following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) G has the uniqueness property.
(ii) For any assignment of cost functions, each user's equilibrium cost is the same in all Nash equilibria.
(iii) For any assignment of cost functions, and for any pair of strict Nash equilibria, some user's equilibrium cost is the same in both equilibria.
As mentioned in the introduction, whether the uniqueness property holds for a given network depends on its topology. Clearly, connecting two or more networks with the uniqueness property in series results in a network that also has this property, because the users' choice of routes in each constituent network does not restrict the choices or affect the costs in the other networks. In Milchtaich [12] and Konishi [8] , the uniqueness property is shown to hold for all parallel networks. In fact, as the following theorem shows, this property holds for all five networks in Figure 4 . Moreover, these networks and those constructed by connecting several of them in series are essentially the only two-terminal networks with the uniqueness property.
Theorem 4.1. A two-terminal network has the uniqueness property if and only if it is nearly parallel or it consists of two or more nearly parallel networks connected in series.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 2.1 is that the networks without the uniqueness property are precisely those in which one of the forbidden networks is embedded in the wide sense. In this sense, these four networks are the minimal networks without this property. This result closely resembles Kuratowski's characterization of nonplanar graphs in terms of embedded forbidden graphs (Harary [7] , Diestel [6] ). In both cases, the set of minimal graphs or networks without a particular property (planarity, the uniqueness property) is finite (with two and four elements, respectively). In the case of planer graphs, this may be viewed as a corollary of Robertson and Seymour's minor graph theorem (see Diestel [6] ). Whether a version of this theorem also holds for the present case of two-terminal networks and embedding in the wide sense is unknown.
Corollary 4.1. For every two-terminal network G, there exists some assignment of cost functions with multiple equilibrium costs if and only if one of the forbidden networks is embedded in the wide sense in G.
For the network in Figure 2 (a), Example 1.1 specifies cost functions with two strict Nash equilibria such that each user's equilibrium cost is not the same in both equilibria. These cost functions give rise to the same equilibrium costs in the second network in Figure 2 , which differs from the first only in that the origin and destination are interchanged. For the network in Figure 2 (c), Example 1.2 specifies cost functions with two Nash equilibria, the first strictly Pareto dominating the second. In this example, both equilibria are not strict. However, it is easy to modify Example 1.2 such that the two equilibria become strict. For example, if the two cost functions of the form 8x are changed to 8 7x, those of the form 6x to 6 5x, and the constant 6/7 to 1 1, each user's equilibrium cost is still lower in the first equilibrium than in the second, but in both equilibria, the cost of the user's equilibrium route is strictly less than that of the other routes. It follows that the modified cost functions can also be used for the network in Figure 2 (d): Two strict Nash equilibria with arbitrarily close costs to those in the previous network can be obtained simply by assigning a sufficiently low cost (e.g., a cost function of x/50) to edge e 6 . Another assignment of cost functions with a multiplicity (indeed, continuum) of equilibrium costs for the network in Figure 2(d) is given in the next example. Note the very simple form of the cost functions in this example: linear, without constant terms. In Examples 1.1 and 1.2, differences among the users involve both the slopes of the cost curves, which reflect the degree to which different users are affected by congestion in each edge, and the intercepts, which represent their intrinsic preferences. (For example, some drivers may prefer shorter routes, even when the traffic flow on them is relatively slow, while for others, distance may be relatively less important than time.) Proposition 4.1 shows that differences of the latter kind are not sufficient for multiplicity of the equilibrium costs. As the following example shows, they are also not necessary. Figure 6 . There is one Nash equilibrium in which 5/18 of Class I users (1/8 of the total population) take the route e 1 e 6 e 4 ; 5/18 of Class II users take the route e 2 e 6 e 3 ; and all the other users take e 5 . In this equilibrium, each user's equilibrium cost is the same, 0.75. There is another Nash equilibrium in which 5/36 of Class I users (1/16 of the total population) take the route e 1 e 6 e 4 ; 5/36 of Class II users take the route e 2 e 6 e 3 ; the rest of Class I and II users take e 5 ; and all Class III users take the route e 2 e 6 e 4 . In this equilibrium, the cost for all users is 0.775.
By using these examples, it is possible to construct an assignment of cost functions with multiple equilibrium costs for any given network that does not have the uniqueness property. Of course, other such assignments also exist. Konishi [8] gives an example of such an assignment for a network in which the one in Figure 2(b) is embedded in the wide sense. Incidentally, with a finite number of nonidentical users (of equal mass, or congestion impact), the equilibrium costs need not be unique even in a parallel network (cf. Milchtaich [11] ). The finite case also differs from that of a continuum of users in that an equilibrium need not exist. Although a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies always exists in a parallel network (Milchtaich [10, 11] ), this is not so for the network obtained by adding a single edge joining o and d to the forbidden network in Figure 2 (c) (with three players), or to the nearly parallel one in Figure 4 (e) (with two players). Konishi [8] gives another example. The question of what topological conditions are both necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibrium in the finite case is open.
Equivalence of equilibria.
The uniqueness result for a heterogeneous population of users (Theorem 4.1) can be taken one step further. In a network with the uniqueness property, not only is the flow on each arc the same in all Nash equilibria, but generically, it is also made up of the same mixture of user types. While it is very easy, even for networks with the uniqueness property, to construct examples in which different types of users traverse a given arc in different equilibria, the generic uniqueness result entails that such examples depend on the existence of certain special relations among cost functions. If there is no a priori reason to assume that such relations exist, a unique composition of user types would be expected for each arc.
The theorem below is an extension of a similar result for parallel networks (Milchtaich [12, Theorem 4.3] ). It is based on a very similar model to that used in that special case.
A partition of the population is a finite disjoint family of measurable sets I 1 I 2 I n , the user classes, such that m I m = I and I m > 0 for all m. (Extension to the case of an infinite-even uncountably infinite-family of user classes is possible. The formulation would closely follow that in Milchtaich [12] .) A user class is interpreted as a group of users who are known to be of the same type. For given partition of the population and network G, let denote the set of all assignments of continuous and strictly increasing cost functions c
measurable, it follows from the remarks at the beginning of §4 that every element of has a nonempty set of Nash equilibria. Two Nash equilibria and will be said to be equivalent if the contribution of each user class I m to the flow on each arc a is the same in and ; i.e., the measure of the set of all users i ∈ I m such that i contains a is equal to the measure of the set of all users i ∈ I m such that i contains a. This condition clearly implies that the flow on each arc is the same in both equilibria. [12] , is equivalent to some complete metric for , in the sense that the two metric topologies are the same. In other words, the metric space is topologically complete). In a metric space, a property is considered to be generic if it holds in an open dense set (Mas-Colell [9, §8.2]). The following theorem asserts that the property that all Nash equilibria are equivalent is generic if and only if the network satisfies condition (i) in Proposition 2.1. Put in another way, condition (ii) states that, for every partition of the population, the set of all assignments of cost functions in with two (or more) nonequivalent Nash equilibria is nowhere dense in . Together, Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 imply the following addition to Proposition 4.2. 6. Remarks. The results in this paper, which link network topology with uniqueness of arc flows and equilibrium costs, are similar in spirit to those of Milchtaich [13] , which link network topology with Pareto efficiency of equilibria. However, uniqueness and Pareto efficiency are each equivalent to a different topological property. Specifically, a two-terminal network has the property that, for any assignment of cost functions of the form considered here, all the equilibria are Pareto efficient if and only if it is a network with linearly independent routes in the sense that every route has at least one edge that is not in any other route (Milchtaich [13, Theorem 3] ). On the other hand, linear independence of the routes is not a necessary or sufficient condition for the network to have the uniqueness property, because it holds for the first two networks in Figure 2 , but not for the last two, and for the first four networks in Figure 4 , but not for the last one.
A weaker topological property than linearly independent routes, which holds for all the networks in Figure 2 , is a series-parallel network, i.e., one which can be constructed from single edges by sequentially connecting networks in series or in parallel. However, because the network in Figure 4 (e) is not series-parallel, even this is not a necessary (or sufficient) condition for the network to have the uniqueness property. Theorem 1 in Milchtaich [13] shows that for a population of identical users, a series-parallel network is a necessary and sufficient condition for Braess's paradox never to occur. Braess's paradox is said to occur when lowering the cost of one or more arcs increases the users' equilibrium cost. With nonidentical users, a natural generalization of Braess's paradox can occur even in a seriesparallel network (but not in one with linearly independent routes; see Milchtaich [13] ). For example, replacing the constant 6/7 in Example 1.2 with a higher value would only leave the first equilibrium mentioned, in which each user's equilibrium cost is 18/7. Replacing it with any positive constant less than 6/7 would leave only the second equilibrium, in which all the users have equilibrium costs higher than 18/7. This paper and Milchtaich [13] both consider undirected networks, and view directionality, if it exists, as part of the cost functions. In a series-parallel network, edges have intrinsic directions, because all routes pass through each edge in the same direction (see Milchtaich [13] ). Of the networks in Figures 2 and 4 , only that in Figure 4 (e) is not series-parallel, and in this network, uniqueness of the equilibrium cost does not depend on how the edges joining u and v are directed. Nevertheless, the results in this paper would not hold if edges were viewed as having predetermined directions. This is demonstrated by the two directed networks in Figure 7 . The undirected version of the network in Figure 7 (a) is homeomorphic to that in Figure 4 (e). Therefore, for any assignment of cost functions, the equilibrium flow on each arc is unique and, in addition, for any partition of the population, there is an open dense set in the space such that, for every assignment of cost functions in this set, all Nash equilibria are equivalent. The same clearly holds for the second directed network in Figure 7 , in which the directed routes are essentially the same as in the first. However, this directed network cannot be constructed by connecting in series directed versions of nearly parallel networks. This shows that Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 do not hold for directed networks. The directed network in Figure 7 (b) also cannot be obtained by subdivision of edges, addition of edges, or subdivision of terminal vertices from any of the forbidden networks if these are directed in the natural manner as series-parallel networks. This shows that Proposition 2.1 also does not hold for directed networks, which demonstrates the usefulness of the present approach of linking uniqueness of equilibrium costs with the topology of the undirected network. This paper only considers networks with two terminal vertices. In one sense, this limitation is not too severe. A network with multiple origin-destination pairs may be modelled by connecting all origins to a single, fictitious vertex o, and similarly for the destinations. The restriction of each user i to a specific origin can be implemented by assigning a very high cost to the edges joining o with the other origins, and similarly for i's destination. Thus, user-specific cost functions partially compensate for the topological limitation of a single origin-destination pair. If the augmented network, constructed as above, has the uniqueness property, then the equilibrium costs are unique also for any assignment of cost functions and origin-destination pairs in the original network. However, it is easy to see that the uniqueness property is not a necessary condition for this. Thus, user-specific cost functions cannot completely circumvent the topological limitation. Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the number of edges in G. If there is only one edge, condition (i) in Proposition 2.1 clearly holds. Suppose that G has more than one edge. The induction hypothesis will be that the assertion of the lemma holds for every network with a smaller number of edges than G. If G can be constructed by connecting two other networks in series, then, by the induction hypothesis, (i) each of these networks is nearly parallel or consists of several nearly parallel networks connected in series, or (ii) a forbidden network is embedded in the wide sense in at least one of them. In the first case, condition (i) in Proposition 2.1 holds for G, and in the second, condition (ii) holds. Suppose next that G has more than one edge, but it cannot be constructed by connecting two other networks in series. By Milchtaich [13, Lemma 1] (which is essentially part of Harary [7, Theorem 3.3] ), this implies that there are two routes in G that do not have any common edges or vertices other than o and d (i.e., parallel routes). The edges and vertices in these two routes constitute a subnetwork of G, which is homeomorphic to a two-edge parallel network. Consider the collection of all nearly parallel subnetworks of G with two or more routes. In this collection, choose a maximal subnetwork G , i.e., one that is not itself a subnetwork of any other member of the collection. If G = G, then G is nearly parallel, and the proof is complete. Suppose, then, that some route r in G includes an edge e that is not in G . Let u be the last vertex before e in r that is in G , and v the first vertex after e in r that is in G . None of the edges and vertices in r that follow u and precede v are in G . Adding these edges and vertices to G results in a subnetwork of G that is homeomorphic to a network G obtained by adding a single edge to G . The assumed maximality of G implies that G is not nearly parallel. Therefore, to complete the proof of the lemma, it suffices to establish the following.
Claim. Let G be a network that results from adding a single edge e to a nearly parallel network G with two or more routes. Then, one of the forbidden networks is embedded in the wide sense in G or G is nearly parallel.
The proof of the claim involves checking five cases, (a) through (e). In each case, G is assumed to be homeomorphic to the corresponding network in Figure 4 .
Case (a). If the end vertices of e (the edge added to G ) are o and d, then G is nearly parallel (specifically, homeomorphic to a parallel network). If at least one end vertex is not o or d, then depending on whether the network G has (i) only two or (ii) three or more routes, the network G is (i) homeomorphic to one of the networks in Figures 4(b)-4(e) , or (ii) homeomorphic to a network obtained by adding one or more edges joining o and d to one of these four networks. In the first case, G is nearly parallel, and in the second, one of the networks in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) is embedded in it in the wide sense.
Case (b). In this case, there is a unique nonterminal vertex u in G of degree three or higher, and a unique route r that does not include u. Case (d). In this case, there are two nonterminal vertices in G of degree three or higher, u and v, and a unique route r that does not include either of them. The analysis of the present case is identical, verbatim, to that of Case (b) except for the final sentence, which has to be modified as follows. If both end vertices of e follow u, then depending on whether at least one of them precedes v, one of them coincides with v and the other one follows it, or both of them follow v, the network in Figure 2 Case (e). The network in Figure 4 (e) can be obtained from that in 4(b) by subdivision of d and from that in 4(c) by subdivision of o. Therefore, it is not difficult to see that a network homeomorphic to G can be obtained from a network homeomorphic to either 4(b) or 4(c) by (i) addition of an edge, followed by (ii) subdivision of a terminal vertex. Clearly, if the network obtained in the interim stage (after the first operation is carried out) is also homeomorphic to one of the networks in Figures 4(b) and 4(c) , then G is homeomorphic to that in Figure 4(e) . If the network obtained in the interim stage is not homeomorphic to one of these two networks, then it follows from the analysis of Cases (b) and (c) that one of the forbidden networks is embedded in it in the wide sense, and in this case, the same is true for G .
Proof of Proposition 2.1. In view of Lemma 7.1, it suffices to show that if a network satisfies condition (i), then no forbidden network is embedded in it in the wide sense. Clearly, a forbidden network does not satisfy condition (i), because none of the networks in Figure 2 is homeomorphic to any of those in Figure 4 , or can be obtained by connecting any two other networks in series. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove the following.
Claim. Suppose that a network G is embedded in the wide sense in a network G that satisfies condition (i). Then, G also satisfies (i).
To prove this claim, it clearly suffices to consider the case in which G is obtained from G by one of the three operations defining embedding in the wide sense. If the operation is the subdivision of an edge, then the two networks are homeomorphic, and so one of them satisfies condition (i) if and only if the other network does so. Next, suppose that G is obtained from G by the addition of a single edge e joining two existing vertices. Assume, without loss of generality, that G is nearly parallel. Both end vertices of e are terminal vertices or have degree three or higher. Hence, each of them can only be one of those marked o, d, u, or v in the various networks in Figure 4 . It follows that G , which can be recovered by removing e from G , is necessarily a nearly parallel network or can be obtained from one by connecting it in series with one or two networks with single edges. For example, if G is homeomorphic to the network in Figure 4(e) , then G must be homeomorphic to one of those in Figures 4(a) and 4(e) (this is the case if e joins u and v), or to a network obtained by connecting in series a network with a single edge and one of those in Figures 4(a)-4(c) . This proves that, in the case of the addition of an edge, G satisfies condition (i).
It remains to consider the case in which G is obtained from G by the subdivision of a terminal vertex, say d. The vertex v and edge e thereby created belong to a nearly parallel network G, which (by condition (i)) either coincides with G or gives it after connection in series with another network satisfying (i). The latter possibility necessarily holds if e is the only edge incident with d, in which case the network connected in series with G is the original network G , which hence satisfies condition (i). Suppose, then, that e is not the only edge incident with d. Every other edge incident with d is included in some route that does not include v. This implies that v is a nonterminal vertex in G, and by definition of terminal subdivision, the degree of v is three or higher. These properties of e and v essentially identify them uniquely. In particular, they imply that G cannot be homeomorphic to one of the networks in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) , in which a vertex and an edge with these properties do not exist. If G is homeomorphic to one of the networks in Figures 4(c) and  4(d) , then v must be the vertex marked as such, and e the edge joining it with d. This shows that, before the subdivision of d, the network that is now G was homeomorphic to one of the networks in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) , which proves that condition (i) holds for the original network G . The same conclusion holds if G is homeomorphic to the network in Figure 4 (e), in which case similar reasoning shows that the network that is now G was formerly homeomorphic to that in Figure 4 (b).
An independent argument showing that a network cannot satisfy both conditions in Proposition 2.1 is given in the proof of Proposition 4.2 below. Together with Lemma 7.1, it constitutes an alternative, partially "game-theoretic," proof for Proposition 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Suppose that the users' cost functions are identical up to additive constants, and let i 0 be one of the users. Then, 
for all users i, arcs a, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Let andˆ be two Nash equilibria, and, for each arc a, let f a andf a be the flow on a in andˆ , respectively. For every user i and route r, define r i as 1 or 0 according to whether i is equal to or different from r, respectively. Defineˆ r i in a similar manner. Because is a Nash equilibrium, it follows from (1) that, for all users i, By strict monotonicity of the cost functions, each term in the last sum is nonnegative, and is moreover positive if f a =f a . Therefore, all terms must be zero, and moreover, f a =f a must hold for all arcs a. This implies that the cost of each route for each user is the same in andˆ and, therefore, the equilibrium costs are also equal. Proof. To prove the first assertion, it clearly suffices to consider a network G obtained from G by either the subdivision or removal of a single edge e. In the latter case, the uniqueness property clearly holds for G if it holds for G, because removing an edge is equivalent to forcing its cost to be prohibitively high for all users. In the former case, only the sum of the costs of the two parts of e (in each of the two directions) matters, because any route in G that includes one of them also includes the other. Therefore, for any given cost function for e in a particular direction, subdividing this edge and assigning half the original cost to each of its two parts has no effect on the costs of the routes. It is, therefore, clear that the uniqueness property holds for G if and only if it holds for G.
If G results from connecting two networks G and G in series, then there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between the set of all routes in G and the Cartesian product of the set of all routes in G and the set of all routes in G . This induces a one-to-one correspondence between the set of all strategy profiles in G and the Cartesian product of the set of all strategy profiles in G and that of all strategy profiles in G . There is also a one-to-one correspondence, defined by restrictions, between the set of all assignments of cost functions for G and the Cartesian product of the set of all assignments of cost functions for G and those for G . It is not difficult to see that a strategy profile in G is a Nash equilibrium with respect to a given assignment if and only if the corresponding strategy profiles and in G and G are Nash equilibria with respect to the respective restrictions. If G does not have the uniqueness property, then there is an assignment of cost functions for G with two Nash equilibria and such that the flow on some arc a in is different from that in . If a is in G , say, then these arc flows are the same as in and , respectively, and therefore G does not have the uniqueness property. Conversely, if G does not have the uniqueness property, then any assignment of cost functions for G with two Nash equilibria with different arc flows, and any assignment of cost functions for G with at least one Nash equilibrium, together define an assignment of cost functions for G for which the equilibrium arc flows are not unique. Proof. To prove that the network in Figure 4 (a) has the uniqueness property, it suffices to show that those in 4(b) and 4(c) have it. This is because, if the first network has more than one edge, connecting it in series with a network with a single edge gives a network that can also be obtained from that in Figure 4 (b) or the one in 4(c) by removing the edge joining o and d. Therefore, it follows from Lemma 7.2 that if the networks in Figures 4(b) and 4(c) have the uniqueness property, so does that in 4(a). To prove that these two networks indeed have the uniqueness property, it suffices to show that the one in Figure 4 (e) has it. This is because a network with a single edge connected in series with the network in Figure 4 (b) or 4(c) can be obtained by the removal of one of the edges incident with the origin or the destination, respectively, in 4(e). Finally, the network in Figure 4 (d) has the uniqueness property if and only if the one in 4(c) has it. This is because, in the former network, the edge preceding u and that following v together affect route costs in the same way as the single edge following v does in the latter network. In conclusion, it suffices to prove that the uniqueness property holds for the network in Figure 4 (e).
Let andˆ be two Nash equilibria with respect to the same assignment of cost functions for the network in Figure 4 (e). For each arc a, let f a be the flow on a in ,f a the flow inˆ , and f a = f a −f a . Clearly, f e 1 + f e 2 = f e 3 + f e 4 = 0. It has to be shown that f a = 0 for all arcs a.
Suppose that the assumption of the claim holds, or, equivalently, f e 2 ≤ 0 ≤ f e 4 . Let 1 be the set of all arcs with the initial vertex u and terminal vertex v, and 2 the set of all arcs with the initial vertex v and terminal vertex u. Each arc in 1 is contained in a unique route in G. Let + 1 be the set of all routes that contain some arc a ∈ 1 with f a > 0. Similarly, let − 2 be the set of all routes that contain some arc a ∈ 2 with f a < 0. For each user i, the cost of the equilibrium route i is not greater than that of any alternative route. Therefore, if i contains some arc a ∈ 1 , necessarily c f a for all a ∈ 1 with f a ≤ 0. In this case, the routeˆ i cannot include the edges e 2 or e 3 or contain any arc a ∈ 1 with f a ≤ 0 (because less costly alternatives exist, andˆ is an equilibrium). This proves that, for all users i with i ∈ + 1 , alsoˆ i ∈ + 1 . Therefore, if + 1 is not empty, then there must be some a ∈ 1 with f a > 0 such that the measure of the set of all users i for whom i contains a is less than or equal to the measure of the set of users i for whomˆ i contains a. However, this implies that f a ≤f a , which contradicts the assumption f a > 0. This contradiction proves that f a for every arc a ∈ 1 with f a ≤ 0, which implies that such an arc cannot be contained inˆ i . Therefore, none of the arcs in 1 is contained inˆ i . Because alsoˆ i = e 1 e 3 , the routeˆ i must begin with e 2 . Because andˆ are equilibria, the inequalities c This is established in Claim 1 under the assumption that f e 1 ≥ 0 ≥ f e 3 . By symmetry, this also holds if f e 1 ≤ 0 ≤ f e 3 . By Claim 2, f e 1 and f e 3 cannot both be (strictly) positive. By symmetry, they cannot both be negative, either. Therefore, the assertion of the claim always holds. Lemma 7.5. Let G be a network for which there exists an assignment of cost functions with two strict Nash equilibria and as in Lemma 7.4 . Then, the same is true also for every network G in which G is embedded in the wide sense. That is, there is an assignment of cost functions for G with two strict Nash equilibria, such that each user's equilibrium cost in one equilibrium is different from that in the other equilibrium.
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to consider the case in which G is obtained from G by one of the three operations defining embedding in the wide sense. If the operation is the subdivision or addition of an edge, the conclusion is immediate. In the former case, the assignment of cost functions for G is the same as for G except that, for each user, the cost in each direction of the edge that was subdivided is equally divided between its two parts. In the latter case, the cost for each user of the edge that was added is set higher than the user's equilibrium costs in and . It remains to consider the case in which G is obtained from G by the subdivision of a terminal vertex.
Without loss of generality, the cost of each edge in G incident with the origin or the destination is greater than unity for all users. Terminal subdivision adds a new edge e, which is incident with the origin or the destination, and is appended to some users' equilibrium routes in or in . Provided that the cost assigned to e is sufficiently low, the routes with the appended edge remain equilibrium routes for these users, and the two equilibrium costs remain distinct. Specifically, this is the case if the cost of e for each user is less than: (i) unity, (ii) the difference between the cost of the equilibrium route and that of any alternative route in G , both in and in (these differences are all greater than zero, because the equilibria are strict), and (iii) the absolute value of the difference between the user's equilibrium costs in and (which, by assumption, are not equal).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Clearly, for every network G, the first condition implies the second, and the second implies the third. By Lemma 7.1 (or Proposition 2.1), one of the two conditions in Proposition 2.1 holds for G. If (i) in Proposition 2.1 holds, then by Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, G has the uniqueness property. If (ii) holds, then by Lemmas 7.4 and 7.5, there is an assignment of cost functions for G with two strict Nash equilibria such that each user's equilibrium cost in one equilibrium is different from that in the other. Therefore, either G satisfies all three conditions in Proposition 4.2, or it does not satisfy any of them.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The proof of the theorem is contained within that of Proposition 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose that condition (i) does not hold. By the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 4.2, there is an assignment of cost functions for G with two strict Nash equilibria such that the flow on some arc is not the same in both equilibria. Moreover, inspection of the proofs of Lemmas 7.4 and 7.5 shows that there is a partition of the population into three user classes such that this assignment is in the corresponding space . Because the two equilibria are strict, there is some > 0 such that each of them is also an equilibrium in every assignment of cost functions in that is less than a distance from the original one. This shows that the set of all assignments of cost functions for which all Nash equilibria are equivalent is not dense in , and thus proves that condition (ii) in the theorem implies (i). It remains to prove the converse implication.
Suppose that the network G satisfies condition (i). Fix some partition of the population, with user classes I 1 I 2 I n , and consider the corresponding space of assignments of cost functions . For each element of and each user class I m , the number of minimalcost routes for this user class, which will be denoted by m , is the same in all Nash equilibria. This is because the cost for each user of each route is determined by the arc flows, which, by Theorem 4.1, are the same in all Nash equilibria. Therefore, the mean number of minimal-cost routes, = n m=1 I m m , is also the same in all equilibria, and thus defines a real-valued function on .
Claim 1. The function
→ is upper semicontinuous and has a finite range.
The proof of the assertion that is upper semicontinuous is very similar to that of Milchtaich [12, Lemma 3.4] , and is omitted. The second assertion follows from the fact that the cardinality of the range of does not exceed n , the number of routes in G to the power of the number of user classes.
Claim 2. For every assignment of cost functions in that is a point of continuity of , all Nash equilibria are equivalent.
To prove this claim, consider an assignment of cost functions in with two nonequivalent Nash equilibria andˆ . It has to be shown that has a discontinuity at this assignment. For each user class I m and path p, let f m p denote the measure of the set of all users i ∈ I m small, this proves that has a discontinuity at the original assignment. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
Together with Claims 1 and 2, the following claim completes the proof of the theorem. Every point of continuity of such a function g has an open neighborhood in which this function is constant, and hence continuous. This proves that the set of all points of continuity is open. To prove that this set is dense in , consider any open set U . Let x 0 ∈ U be such that g x 0 = min x∈U g x . By upper semicontinuity of g, there is a neighborhood V of x 0 such that g x ≤ g x 0 for all x ∈ V . Clearly, in U ∩ V , g x = g x 0 for all x, and g is therefore continuous at x 0 .
